Introduction
Man has, since time immemorial sought to explore mechanisms by which his assets remain protected. Consequently, the Corporation or Company has remained a favoured and common asset protection mechanism which serves to successfully externalise risk arising from business and other transactions. The means by which such externalization of risk is achieved is largely attributed to the legal nature of a corporation as being a distinct legal person capable of suing and being sued in its own name. 1 This externalization manifests itself in varying forms and is achieved through the legal concept of 'limited liability', by which the members of the company would ordinarily not be personally liable for the debts or actions of the Company. Thus the law creates a dichotomy or veil between the Company on one hand and the persons who own and control it on the other. 2 The legal conjuring of legal personality in a company renders the company a legal person capable of engaging in contract, incur liabilities and own property amidst a plethora of other functions, while protecting its owners and controllers from liability for actions carried out in the name of such Company. This degree of control, distinct legal personality and limited liability elevates the Company as being one of the most viable and Undoubtedly the principal consequences of incorporation is that a corporation, becomes a juristic entity separate from those who control it and is capable of suing and being sued in its name. 15 Additionally incorporation also bring about the limited liability of the director and members, with the effect that they are generally not liable for the debts of the corporation.
Moreover, the assets of a corporation are the exclusive property of the corporation itself and not of those who control it. In Salomon 16 , the locus classicus on this topic by Lord MacNaghten elaborated the motives for incorporation in the following terms:
"Among the principal reasons which induce persons to form private companies … are the desire to avoid the risk of bankruptcy, and the increased facility afforded for borrowing money. By means of a private company a trade can be carried on with limited liability, and without exposing the persons interested in it in the event of failure to the harsh provisions of the bankruptcy law." 17
The doctrine of limited liability was legislated in England by way of the the Limited Liability Act 18 as a means by which companies could raise capital by selling company shares without exposing the shareholders to unlimited liability. '19 In other words, shareholders, directors, officers and employees of a corporation benefit from the doctrine of limited liability, in which none of them are liable for actions taken on behalf of the corporation. This immunity from personal liability has traditionally been one of the luring factors of the corporate form of organization to its shareholders, officers and directors. This limitation to liability is arguably the catalyst for the corporation to be employed as a viable asset protection mechanism.
The Economic Necessity and justification of Limited Liability
Modern economies rely upon the taking of risks and the entrepreneurial spirit of its stakeholders. In essence, the taking of risks which is part and parcel of industry warrants some legal protection being afforded to the risk taker so as to spur industry and prevent investors from retreating into proverbial foxholes. Llanillo 23 argues that limited liability was conceived, with the objectives, of: (1) encouraging economic expansion through investment (the "Economic Theory"), and (2) democratization of wealth or the opportunity to accumulate it (the ''Democratic Theory"). He argues further that Capitalintensive industries require substantial amounts of capital and one way to attract capital is to assure investors that they could invest without risking all their personal assets. With limited liability, owners are set free to invest in various business ventures without the need to incur the American law allowed corporations to acquire shares of another corporation, also called "intercorporate stock ownership."). 22 excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise close1y. Important policy objectives validate this limited liability shield and serves as an incentive for investors through the promise that "they will have no personal liability for the corporation's debts. 24 The concept of limited liability makes a number of other traits of the corporation feasible. For example the transferability of shares would be severely hampered in the absence of limited liability. Every potential buyer of shares in a company would have to investigate the wealth of all other shareholders in order to determine the exact risk he faces in becoming a shareholder.
Insecurity concerning the risk carried by an investment directly results in complications in the valuation of shares. Limited liability consequently enables the existence of stock markets since a single share price can be listed for investors to observe. Under unlimited liability share prices would fluctuate not only due to the operations of the company which affect the present value of future cash flows, but also due to changes in the personal wealth of all shareholders. 25 This simplification of transferability acts as a check and balance against the power of management.
In the absence of limited liability it would be impossible to define the amount of specific risk of a portfolio through diversification since every investment could claim not only invested capital but also personal wealth. In fact, in the case of unlimited liability, diversification would rather increase risks since every investment could potentially go bankrupt. A rational investor would therefore minimize the number of companies he invests in, in order to be able to monitor these Additionally, there are those circumstances where obligations incurred by shareholders in their personal capacity are treated as if they were incurred by the company. Whatever form it takes, veil piercing is an "exceptional procedure." 28 A company's separate existence is metaphorically described as a "veil". This veil functions as a partition between the company and its directors and other members and protects them from the claims of those who deal with the company. The corporate veil, then, is a fundamental aspect of company law and is a protective device for those who exist behind it. 29 Thus the incorporation of a company casts a metaphorical protective veil over the true controllers of the company, a veil through which the law will not usually penetrate. 30 take a fact-based approach to questions of piercing the corporate veil, and no particular trend is readily discernible from an overview of the cases. 35 It is material to note that the Piercing of a veil does not contest the validity of the separate legal entity principle but instead is relevant strictly to the concept of limited liability. The veil of incorporation is thus relevant essentially to the shareholders of a corporation and not to its officers. Thus, veil piercing is therefore a doctrine to overcome limited liability rather than the separate legal entity of the company. The distinction between the meanings of the two phrases is perhaps not as widely recognised in Australia, with courts sometimes referring to lifting when the effect is piercing. 41 Thus, this paper shall not draw such distinction either.
The inception of 'Veil Piercing.'
Historically, the English corporate veil doctrine experienced the legal limelight during the post 2 nd world war era. Notable veil piercing cases in this period included In re FG (Films), 42 As addressed previously, the law has devised a variety grounds which would validate the piercing of the corporate veil. 53 It must be noted that venturing into such piercing presents a quandary to the courts. This is so as the separate entity theory of a company has several ramifications. It provides a company with the right to sue and to be sued in their own name; retain and enjoy its profits and have the capacity to contract with anybody including their only shareholder. 54 for the debts of their company and cannot be held liable for any wrongdoings.
Therefore when presented with an application to pierce a corporate veil, the courts seek a balancing of these fundamental principles which in turn restricts the application of the piercing of the corporate veil. Only in exceptional circumstances will the court look beyond and thereby override the company's legal personality in order to examine and ascertain the true state of affairs. Fraud is one of the most prominent of those exceptional circumstances, either in establishing the business or in conducting the business. Where an individual creates or runs a company to act as a shield for fraudulent purposes that veil will be lifted, if not ripped or rudely torn away, to expose the true perpetrators. 55 In essence, the Courts seek to respect the sanctity of the idea that a company is a separate legal entity on one hand and acknowledges the need to pull off its mask on the other when the circumstances warrant it. 56
Chartering the parameters of Fraud. The Company functioning as a tool for fraudulent purposes or engaging in fraud would justify the piercing of the corporate veil and holding the members of the company personally liable. In exploring the approach of Courts in confronting the corporate veil in circumstances of fraud, it is material to note that fraud can manifest itself in varying circumstances and cannot be restricted to a strict definition. It is argued that the Courts would take into consideration the circumstances surrounding the trade, business or actions of the company in concluding that a fraudulent act has been committed. protection offered by the shield of separate corporate personality and render them liable under the contract they have sought to use an instrument of fraud'. 61 In elaborating this concept, the use of a company to avoid a legal duty that falls on the controller of the company personally has been held to justify the piercing of the veil. The case in point is the seminal English case of Gilford Motors V. Horne. 62 In this Case, Horne was the managing Director of Gilford Motors Co., a company that assembled and repaired cars. Horne's contract was subject to an anti-competitive trade clause which forbade him from soliciting customers for his own purposes while he worked for the company or after he left the company. wrongdoing by using a company that they controlled fraudulently as a shield and thus as a tool. In those circumstances the courts were willing to pierce the veil in order to prevent the claimants being denied an effective remedy. It is important to note that in both cases it was an equitable remedy, rather than damages, which the court awarded after piercing the corporate veil. However, the legal parameters of the ground of fraud, where a company is used as a facade or an instrument for fraud, does not remain well settled as evidenced by the recent reaffirmation of the law in the English judgment of VTB Capital plc 76 
"In my judgement the court is entitled to 'pierce the corporate veil' and recognise the receipt of the company as that of the individual in control of it if the company was used as a device or facade to conceal the true facts thereby avoiding or concealing any liability of those individuals" 79
The contemporary perception of veil piercing in England.
The recent judgements of Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Stepanovs 80 and VTB Capital plc v
Nutritek International Corp 81 are material to this study for they reveal the contrasting stances adopted by the English Courts in settling the law on this subject and also because they allowed the seemingly anathematic proposition of holding non-parties to a contract liable for a contract to which they were not a signatory despite it being patently inimical to the theory of privity of contract. 82 Gramsci 83 involved thirty 'one ship' companies incorporated in a number of off-shore jurisdictions, ultimately beneficially owned by the Latvian Shipping Company ('LSC'). Gramsci claimed that LSC had found that there were substantial profits syphoned off when the corporate Defendants had benefitted from chartering vessels to end users at substantially higher rates than in the head charters from the Claimants. Losses were in the region of US$100million, resulting from this dishonest scheme. The claimants successfully argued that the corporate veil should be pierced and a certain Mr.
Stepanovs treated as a party to certain agreements entered into between the claimants and five companies registered in the British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar, one of which was beneficially owned by Mr Stepanovs. Justice Burton held that there was a good arguable case that the claimants should be able to enforce a contract against Mr Stepanovs, the 'puppeteer', despite the contracts being entered into by his 'puppet' company. It is contended that this was a potentially radical decision as it raised the prospect of non-parties being made liable on a contract to which it was not a signatory and at the same time raising the issue as to whether the 'puppeteer' was bound by all the terms of the contract. In reaching his conclusion Justice Burton made a number of findings regarding the court's ability to pierce the corporate veil, which have subsequently received strong criticism from Justice Arnold in VTB Capital. 84 In VTB Capital 85 , the claimants applied to amend their particulars of claim in order to bring a contractual claim against a certain Mr Malofeev, Marcap BVI and Marcap Moscow, despite these defendants not being parties to the loan facility under which the claimants claimed to have been defrauded. VTB contended that it had been defrauded by the Defendants. VTB entered into a facility agreement under which it lent some US$225 million to fund the acquisition of 6 Russian dairy plants, and 3 associated Companies. There was a default and VTB had only been able to recover US$40 million. VTB alleged it was induced to enter into this facility agreement because of fraudulent representations made by Nutritek. Arnold J was therefore required to consider the 84 [2011] EWHC 3107 (Ch) 85 Ibid. law regarding piercing the corporate veil, and in declining to follow Gramsci, criticised the judgment given by Justice Burton and set out the circumstance he believed would justify the courts taking this step and the remedies available once the corporate veil is pierced.
In Gramsci, Justice Burton held that the corporate veil could be pierced, and a claim for damages made, if the conditions in Trustor v Smallbone 86 were satisfied. These being (1) fraudulent misuse of the company structure, and (2) a wrongdoing committed 'dehors' the company. Justice Arnold rejected this finding, stating in particular that he did not agree that there can be a claim for common law damages, as distinct from an equitable remedy, whenever the Trustor 87 conditions are satisfied. 88 Justice Arnold went on to say that a number of authorities show that it is 'inappropriate', where a claim of wrongdoing is made against the controller of a company, to pierce the corporate veil to enable a contractual claim against that person. 89 In Justice Arnold's eyes, Trustor 90 is instead authority for the proposition that, in a claim for knowing receipt, the court will treat receipt by a company as receipt by the individual who controls it if both conditions above are satisfied. 91 Justice Arnold was critical of what he perceived to be an anomaly created by Justice Burton's reasoning in Gramsci. The decision in Gramsci, turns on whether the wrongdoer has attempted to conceal his identity by using the company as a facade fraudulently. The result is that if the wrongdoer conceals his involvement in the company then the corporate veil can be pierced, but if he does not conceal his involvement then it cannot. As a consequence the successful claimant in the former case is entitled to the contractual measure of damages, but in the latter he is restricted to the tortious measure. 92 It is argued that Justice Arnold's contention as to this divergence is valid in law, as a circumstance where the company is not used as a fraudulent facade, given that the identity of the controller was apparent.
Justice Arnold concluded that the effect of the decision is Gramsci was to ignore privity of contract rather than to pierce the corporate veil. Justice Burton had found that there was no good reason why a claimant should not be able to enforce a contract against both the 'puppet' company and the 'puppeteer' who at all times was pulling the strings. He compared this to the circumstances in Gilford and Jones where, on his reading, the claimants sought to enforce their respective contracts against both the puppeteer and the puppet company. 93 Justice Arnold, conversely, pointed out that in neither of those cases were damages awarded against the puppet for the puppeteer's breach. Instead, equitable relief was granted against the puppet company to stop the puppeteer evading contractual liability. 94 Justice Arnold expressed dissatisfaction with Burton J's acceptance of the submission that the notional puppeteer can be made liable for a contract, contending that "as a matter of public policy" he cannot enforce it. 95 It is rare that the Courts had down judgements so patently at odds with each other. The Gramsci from Linsen 98 on the basis that in the latter case, no one set out to abuse the corporate structure from the outset. It was a legitimate company which was later used for illegitimate means to defraud. The wrongdoing, after the contract was entered into, attempted to place assets beyond the reach of creditors. If the Defendants in VTB had been set up for the purposes of defrauding from the outset, perhaps the Judge in VTB would have considered matters differently. It seems that he failed to appreciate that the corporate veil could still be lifted even if it was not the intention of the parties to create a company for the purposes of defrauding, but instead, the objectives to defraud came at a later stage after the contract had been entered into, as in Linsen. The Judge at first instance agreed with the Defendants, refusing to follow Gramsci citing it as an egregious example. A consideration of these determinations reveal that the doctrine of lifting the Corporate Veil in circumstances of fraud should be given more weight than just an equitable remedy, and it seems that following the development of case law, it is within the power and discretion of the English Courts to take such a leap of faith to develop this necessary doctrine of Law.
The American approach.
In The American experience of veil piercing was expanded during the twentieth century.
Originally the theory revolved, mainly around the concept of fraud in the corporate context. 105 In fact, fraud is a conspicuous ground for veil piercing since it arises in a variety of different contexts: including lies or misrepresentations about the purpose of the entity, its capital, debts, assets, independence, the identity of its representatives or on other representations made to third parties. Fraud may also involve greed, hence implying an illicit transfer of property (monies or assets) not belonging to the transferor. Consequently, a myriad of stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, officers, accountants, and others, and even corporations themselves, may be involved or colluded to perpetrate frauds in multifarious and infinite contexts. 106 The American Supreme Court held that veil piercing should be allowed in instances where a shareholder had knowledge of a fraud committed by another shareholder. 107 The Court also stated that limited liability should not be enforced "so far as to enable the corporation to become a means of fraud or a means to evade its responsibilities. succinctly demonstrates the Australian stance on this subject:
"[T]he separate legal personality of a company is to be disregarded only if the court can see that there is, in fact or in law, a partnership between companies in a group, or that there is a mere sham or facade in which that company is playing a role, or that the creation or use of the company was designed to enable a legal or fiduciary obligation to be evaded or a fraud to be perpetrated." (EMPHASIS ADDED)
However the case law in Australia demonstrates that the courts are generally reluctant to lift the corporate veil as would be demonstrated below. 113 Yet insofar as Australia's response to defining 'fraud' for the purposes of veil piercing is concerned, the Australian case law seems to 132 See the empirical study of the frequency with which courts in the United States pierce the corporate distinction in these percentages appear marginal and thus no conspicuous distinction could be identified. 134 Their study 135 also concluded that between the period of 1960 and 1990, while there was a substantial increase in the number of cases where arguments about piercing the corporate veil were postulated there has been a good deal of statistical variance in the piercing rates and no trend is discernible overtime. 136 It must be noted that the Australian Courts have demonstrated an inclination towards veil piercing more so in cases concerning proprietary companies as opposed to public companies. It could be argued that the reasoning for this would lie in inter alia the fact that the control extended by shareholders in public companies is conspicuously lower than proprietary companies. 137 Insofar as the success rates of the grounds urged for the piercing of veils, the study by Ramsay and Noakes indicates that the most successful ground in veil piercing has been unfairness and justice 138 which has been successfully argued in 60% of the cases in which these grounds have been urged. Fraud and sham companies on the other hand have been successfully argued only in 41.67% and 37.5% respectively. The gravitation of the Australian Courts to favouring unfairness/justice as grounds for veil piercing indicates that the fact that Australian courts have adopted an ad hoc approach to veil piercing. These grounds provide for the making of such ad hoc orders by virtue of the obvious ambiguity of the terms the terms unfairness/justice and their susceptibility to various contextual interpretations.
De facto veil piercing
If the objective of veil piercing is to penetrate the legal fiction of limited liability and impose liability on the controllers of the company i.e Directors and Shareholders, it is argued that this could still be achieved through other means as evidenced in the James Hardie Case 139 inter alia. 
In the James Hardie

Conclusion: Venturing ahead.
Limited Liability is undoubtedly a sine qua non for successful trade for it perpetuates the entrepreneurial spirit of industry and encourages economic investment by protecting the shareholder. While it could be argued that for the purposes of shielding the controller for Although an ad hoc explanation may be offered by a court which so decides, there is no 144 See footnote 22. 145 (1989) 16 NSWLR 549, 558 (Rogers AJA). principled approach to be derived from the authorities. Thus it could be argued that Australian courts have approached veil-piercing cases in an ad hoc and opaque manner with underlying policy considerations in mind.
It is contended that the sanctity of the distinct legal personality of a company must be endorsed and protected in view of its economic benefit and thus this paper contends that a trigger happy approach to penetrating the distinct personality of such companies would be undesirable inasmuch as it would be counterproductive economically. This is so, as a judicial gravitation towards veil piercing would eliminate the incentive offered by limited liability and thus would have the spiral effect of driving economic investment away. While this is so, this paper does not dismiss the idea of piercing such veil in circumstances of fraud where the intention of fraud is manifest as evidenced in Re Neo 146 and where the legal device of a company and the privileges it offers is perverted as a modus operandi for fraudulent purposes or as a means of circumventing legal liability or responsibility.
In essence, this paper contends that the sanctity of the doctrine of limited liability must be ensured and furthered, for the raison d'etre of veil piercing is only to prevent the exploitation of this necessary economic concept of limited liability and not to impose itself in a draconian fashion. As such, the stance of the Australian Courts in favouring the ground of unfairness/justice in veil piercing above the ground of fraud and its reluctance to adopt a uniform
